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OUT OF SIGHT BUT NOT OUT OF MIND: NEW
MEXICO'S TAX ON OUT-OF-STATE SERVICES
MICHAEL S. YESLEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Seeking to "level the playing field" for in-state research and development (R&D) firms, New Mexico recently extended its gross receipts
tax (GRT)l to sales of R&D services "performed outside New Mexico
the product of which is initially used in New Mexico" 2-a peculiar hybrid
of gross receipts and use tax features. Previously, the GRT applied to
services only if they were performed in New Mexico, thereby creating a
cost advantage for services performed outside the state.
New Mexico was responding to a special situation: to reach out-ofstate sales to New Mexico buyers, the state generally taxes the buyers'
subsequent use rather than the out-of-state sales. But the major New
Mexico buyers of R&D services are federal entities immune from a use
or any other direct state tax. 3 Those who sell to federal entities are not
immune, 4 however, and for several years New Mexico has imposed the
GRT on receipts from performing services in New Mexico for federal
entities.' Consequently, to reach sales of R&D services performed outside
New Mexico, the state has attempted to impose the GRT on the service
providers.
However, the service providers are also protected, though not immune:
the commerce and due process clauses of the United States Constitution
bar New Mexico from taxing entities that do not have a substantial
connection with the state. Notwithstanding the broad reach of the new
tax on its face, the application of the tax cannot stray beyond these
constitutional bounds. More specifically, the taxed services must be related
to business activities of the service provider in New Mexico. New Mexico
has further limited the reach of the new tax on out-of-state services by
predicating it on the initial use of the product of the services in New
Mexico.

A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School; candidate for LL.M. in Taxation, Southern
Methodist Law School; Staff Attorney, Los Alamos National Laboratory. The United States Department of Energy supported the preparation of this article. The author is grateful for the comments
of Franklin Jones, Esq. on a draft of this article.
1. The GRT is imposed under the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, N.M. STAT.
AxN. §§ 7-9-1 to -82 (Repl. Pamp. 1988) ("Tax Act").
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3(F) (Supp. 1989).
3. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733 (1982).
4. Id. at 734-35.
5. In turn, the federal entities reimburse their service providers for payment of the GRT. Thus,
although the legal incidence of the GRT falls on the service providers, the economic incidence of
the tax is on the federal entities. Under current federal tax immunity doctrine, the economic incidence
of -the state tax is irrelevant. Id. at 735 n.l1.
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Whether this innovative legislation will establish an outpost in the
exportation of state taxes or be consigned to a footnote in the history
of failed attempts to do so remains to be determined. At this juncture,
the New Mexico legislature's creativity provides an occasion to explore
the constitutional limits on sales and gross receipts taxes6 and to consider
the circumstances under which the new tax falls within or outside such
bounds.
II.

BACKGROUND: TAXATION OF GROSS RECEIPTS

The GRT yields more than the combined total revenues from New
Mexico's taxes on income and natural resources 7 and is vital to the
operation of the state government. New Mexico is near last among the
states in per capita personal income8 and well below the United States
average in state and local per capita tax revenue. 9 However, only Tennessee
and Washington derive a greater portion of their tax revenues from
general sales taxes (including taxes on gross receipts), and only the state
governments of Hawaii and Delaware collect a greater share of the total
state and local tax revenues in their jurisdictions. 0 On the other side of
the ledger, the state government also does the bulk (over 70 percent) of
state and local government spending in New Mexico." Thus, from a
budget perspective, government in New Mexico is substantially centralized
and dependent on the GRT.
New Mexico began to rely on the GRT (previously called the Emergency
School Tax) during the Depression, when declining property and income
2
tax collections forced many states to seek new sources of tax revenue.'

6. New Mexico's GRT is customarily stated separately and collected from purchasers on a
transaction-by-transaction basis, because sellers are unwilling or unable to absorb the GRT, set at
a much higher rate (five percent commencing July 1, 1990) than standard gross receipts taxes of
less than one percent in other states. Further, the GRT is generally eliminated from all but the
final stage of production and distribution in which property or services are incorporated. See infra
text accompanying notes 138-39. Thus, the GRT and a retail sales tax-both collected by the sellerare almost indistinguishable, except the GRT is imposed on the seller and customarily passed on
to the buyer, whereas a sales tax is imposed directly on the buyer. "In effect, the gross receipts
tax operates as a tax on the sale of goods and services." United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S.
at 727.
7. Source: BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX
COLLECTIONS N 1988 at 3 (June 1989).
8. New Mexico recently ranked 45th in per capita personal income-all income earned in the
state divided by the state's population. Source: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LxaoR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Vol. 34, No. 5 (May 1987).
9. New Mexico ranked 37th in state and local taxes per capita in 1987. Source: BUREAU OF
CENSUS, U.S. DEPAxTENT OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1986-87 at 106 (November
1988).
10. Id. Correspondingly, New Mexico's reliance on income taxes is substantially below the U.S.
average, and New Mexico is next to last in reliance on property taxes. By comparison, Texas does
not have an income tax, relies less heavily than New Mexico on general sales taxes, and relies
substantially more heavily than New Mexico on property taxes. Colorado relies more heavily than
New Mexico on income and property taxes and less heavily on general sales taxes. Id. at 21.
11. Id. New Mexico was close to the U.S. average for combined state and local government
spending per capita in 1987 but ranked 5th in the state's share of this spending.

12. See 3 SPECIAL. SUBCOM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF HOUSE CoMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 607, 1016 (1965) (Willis Report).
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In 1966, New Mexico reenacted the tax as the current broad-based singlerate GRT "on any person engaging in business in New Mexico." 3 The
initial GRT rate of 3 percent (originally 2 percent under the Emergency
School Tax) has been raised and lowered over the years in inverse response
to the availability of severance taxes.' 4 On July 1, 1990, the rate will
increase from the previous all-time high of 4.75 percent (adopted in 1986)
to 5 percent.'5 In addition, up to 1.75 percent is collected on behalf of
municipalities and counties. Municipalities also receive a "municipal share"
(1.35 percent) of the state's portion.
The major advantages of a tax on gross receipts are its simplicity,
which reduces the costs of compliance and enforcement, and its substantial
yield through relatively low rates, due to the broad base of the tax.' 6
The major criticisms of a tax on gross receipts generally assume the
tax has a very low rate and is substantially absorbed by the businesses
on which it is imposed, thereby creating an uneven burden on different
types and sizes of enterprises due to variations in profitability.' 7 However,
the relatively high rate of the New Mexico GRT and its other similarities
to a sales tax'8 result in significant pass-through of the tax to consumers.
Consequently, the chief objection to the New Mexico GRT, which is
uniformly applied to luxuries and necessaries, 9 is regressivity. 20 Furthermore, as it achieves new heights, the GRT, like the Social Security tax,
is losing its perceived inconsequentiality and coming to be recognized for
the substantial claim it makes on our pocketbooks.
To avoid or limit unpopular tax rate increases, New Mexico and other
states have expanded the bases for imposing sales, property, net income
and other taxes. For obvious reasons, these efforts have often been
directed at out-of-state and federal entities, thereby raising a variety of
questions about the constitutional limits of state taxing authority. Through
the resulting litigation, the United States Supreme Court has gradually
evolved-and continues to evolve-principles and tests for applying the
commerce and due process clauses and other constitutional provisions
2
bearing on the states' attempts to expand their tax bases. '

13.
14.
at DI.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4.A (Repi. Pamp. 1988).
See Robinson, Gross Receipts Tax Victim Fighting Back, Albuquerque J., Oct. 15, 1989,

1990 N.M. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. Ch. 1.
See Willis Report, supra note 12, at 1020.
Id. at 1021.
See note 6.
Housing is excluded from the tax. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-53 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
Studies have reached differing conclusions concerning the distribution of the burden of a
retail sales tax with food exempt. See reports cited in HELLESTEIN & HEuInSTEn, STATE AND
LocAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATELALS 662 (5th ed. 1988). There is little dispute that a broadbased sales tax on goods with no food exemption is regressive. However, the inclusion of a wide
range of services in the GRT tax base may lessen its regressivity. See Select Committee on Tax
Equity, Rethinking Texas Taxes at 41 (1989). Also, low income credits against the New Mexico
state income tax offset the regressivity of the GRT.
21. New Mexico has actively participated in this constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989) (state may impose severance tax on the
same on-reservation production of oil and gas by non-Indian lessees as was subject to the tribe's
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Three principles have emerged as the most significant constitutional
limitations on state taxing authority over interstate transactions: (1) the
requirement of a substantial nexus, or connection, between what is taxed
and the taxing jurisdiction; (2) the prohibition of discrimination against
interstate commerce; and (3) the requirement that taxes be fairly apportioned in order to avoid taxation by more than one state. All three
rules implicate the commerce clause and must be satisfied by a state tax
that affects interstate commerce." The nexus and apportionment requirements arise also under the due process clause, and their applications
under either clause are equivalent. 23 The discrimination requirement overlaps the prohibition against unreasonable classifications under the equal
protection clause, but equal
protection has not played a significant role
24
in limiting state taxation.
The following analysis focuses primarily on nexus because, as will be
discussed, New Mexico's recent amendment of the GRT is unlikely to
run afoul of the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination requirements.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE TAXATION

The commerce clause reserves to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." ' 2 On its face, the commerce clause is an affirmative

own severance tax); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't of New Mexico, 458
U.S. 354 (1982) (where no phase of foreign subsidiaries' business was integrated with parent's,
subsidiaries were not part of unitary business and New Mexico could not tax portion of dividends
from subsidiaries to parent; also, state could not require inclusion in business income of amounts
deemed received for purposes of calculating federal foreign tax credit); United States v. New Mexico,
455 U.S. 720 (1982) (see supra text accompanying notes 3-5); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribe may impose severance tax on the production of oil and gas by nonIndian lessees of wells located on the tribe's reservation); Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) (see
infra text accompanying note 132); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938)
(see infra note 30).
22. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). A fourth rule under the
commerce clause-requiring a "fair relation" between the tax and the benefits provided by the
taxing state-has largely been ignored since its "emasculation" in Commonwealth Edison Company
v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 645 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes
53-60.
23. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 109
S. Ct. 1617, 1625 (1989); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386
U.S. 753, 755 (1967) ("the test whether a particular state exaction is such as to invade the exclusive
authority of Congress to regulate trade between the States, and the test for a State's compliance
with the requirements of due process in this area are similar").
24. See American Dairy Queen v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 93 N.M. 743, 748, 605 P.2d 251.
256 (Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Michael J. Maloof & Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 485, 486,
458 P.2d 89, 90 (1969):
The burden is on Taxpayer "to negative every conceivable basis which might support
the classification."
This heavily weighted burden which is placed upon a taxpayer reduces its ability
almost to the vanishing point to challenge a classification by way of the Equal
Rights Clause of the Constitution.
See also Zinn & Reed, Equal Protection and State Taxation of Interstate Business, 41 TAx LAWYER
83 (1987). The privileges and immunities clauses are also potentially applicable but historically have
been insignificant in the area of state taxation.
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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grant of power to Congress. However, the negative implication of the
6
clause-that the states cannot exercise power reserved to Congress -is
the source27 of the constitutional limits on state taxation of interstate
commerce.
Current commerce clause doctrine in this area dates from a 1977
decision, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,28 in which the Supreme
Court, after reviewing four decades of vacillation on the "perennial
problem" of determining whether a state may tax the privilege of doing
interstate business, overruled a form-over-substance decision that had
barred such a tax29 and upheld a privilege tax in "consideration of the
practical effect of the tax." 3 0 Complete Auto Transit involved a Mississippi
tax on gross income from transporting by truck in Mississippi motor
vehicles that had been shipped into the state by rail. The Court noted:
"[N]o claim is made that the activity is not sufficiently connected to the
State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not fairly related to benefits
provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates against interstate
commerce, or that the tax is not fairly apportioned.''"
The Court's dictum has subsequently been cited as a four-part test
requiring (1) nondiscrimination, (2) fair apportionment, (3) fair relation
to the benefits provided by the taxing state, and (4) nexus.3 2 After
Complete Auto Transit, the abstract notion that a state has directly taxed
the privilege of doing interstate business is immaterial in determining
whether the tax is barred by the commerce clause." The relevant query
about a tax now focuses on its "practical effect," or economic impact,
analyzed by applying the four-part test.
A.

Nondiscrimination
In a recent explanation of this prong, the Supreme Court said: "[A]
tax may violate the Commerce Clause if it is facially discriminatory, has

26. "Even where Congress has not acted affirmatively to protect interstate commerce, the
[Commerce] Clause prevents States from discriminating against that commerce." D.H. Holmes Co.
v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 29 (1988). Dissenting in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington
State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), Justice Scalia ardently challenged this traditional view,
noting "the language of the Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity" and arguing
"[tihere is no conceivable reason why congressional inaction under the Commerce Clause should
be deemed to have the same pre-emptive effect elsewhere accorded only to congressional action.
There, as elsewhere, 'Congress' silence is just that-silence."' 483 U.S. at 261-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)). This position was not espoused
by any other justice, and, indeed, Justice Scalia expressed no reservations from the unanimous
decision in Holmes a year later.
27. See L. TRIBE, AmmucAN CoNsTrmniooNAL LAW § 6-2, at 403 (2d ed. 1988).
28. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
29. Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
30. 430 U.S. at 278. Complete Auto Transit had roots in New Mexico. Nearly four decades
earlier, the Supreme Court approved the imposition of New Mexico's tax on a New Mexico journal's
gross receipts from selling advertising to out-of-state firms, stating: "It was not the purpose of the

Commerce Clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state
tax burden ....
Id. at 279 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250,
254 (1938)).

31. Id.at 287.
32. Though the Court identified the four prongs of the test in Complete Auto Transit, the
explication of the prongs is found in other decisions.
33. See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1988).
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a discriminatory intent, or has the effect of unduly burdening interstate
commerce." 34 As examples of discrimination, the Court noted situations
in which lower taxes were imposed on local products or out-of-state users
paid the same flat tax as local users, but for less usage. 5
Another variant, challenged in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington
State Department of Revenue,3 6 involved a "multiple activities exemption"
from Washington's manufacturing tax for manufacturers who paid that
state's wholesaling tax. The Court overturned the exemption as facially
discriminatory, because Washington manufacturers who marketed their
products in other states might be subject to wholesaling taxes in the
destination states in addition to the manufacturing tax in Washington,
thereby increasing the tax burden on the same goods from the same
manufacturers when sold in interstate commerce.7 Since Washington's
tax was facially discriminatory, the Court said, it was unnecessary to
confirm whether there was actual discrimination, i.e., whether the other
states in which the Washington manufacturers made sales actually imposed
wholesaling taxes. The risk of such taxes was sufficient to invalidate the
exemption. To avoid discrimination, the multiple activities exemption
would have to apply when Washington manufacturers paid any state's
wholesaling tax.3"
These instances of tax discrimination share the characteristic that the
out-of-state taxpayer or interstate transaction is subject to a higher tax,
or the same tax for less usage, in the taxing state. By contrast, the 1989
amendment of New Mexico's GRT would subject the interstate sale of
R&D services performed out of state to the same tax as the sale of the
same services performed in New Mexico, with a credit for sales or similar
taxes paid to another state 3 9 Consequently, discrimination is not one of
the amendment's problems.4
B.

Apportionment
The requirement of fair apportionment is intended "to ensure that
each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction."'4 There
is no single apportionment formula; instead, fair apportionment is tested
by examining whether the tax in question is "internally and externally

34. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 109 S.
Ct. 1617, 1622 (1989).
35. Id. at 1623.
36. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
37. Id. at 240. Interestingly, in this case the Court barred state tax discrimination against instate, not out-of-state, manufacturers selling in interstate commerce. Id. at 253.
38. Id. at 243. Tyler Pipe demonstrates considerable overlap between the nondiscrimination prong
and the internal consistency test for multiple taxation under the apportionment prong, discussed
infra.
39. See infra text accompanying note 155.
40. See Proficient Food Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 107 N.M. 392, 396,
758 P.2d 806, 810 (Ct. App. 1988) ("because New Mexico's gross receipts tax imposes a uniform
tax for doing business in New Mexico and a credit for similar taxes paid to other states, it does
not discriminate against interstate commerce").
41. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
-,
109 S. Ct. 582, 588 (1989).
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consistent." 4 2 The test for internal consistency asks whether multiple
taxation would result from the hypothetical adoption of an identical tax
by other states. The test for external consistency asks whether in practice
the tax reflects only the in-state component of the interstate activity being
taxed. 3
Internal consistency was originally devised as a test for the apportionment of net income taxes, and the application of the test to a gross
receipts tax in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty" and a flat highway use tax in
American Trucking Association v. Scheiner 5 has sharply divided the
Supreme Court.46 However, the Court has avoided this issue as a dispositive factor in several recent decisions, using other grounds to overturn
a gross receipts tax 7 or upholding taxes as fairly apportioned solely
because they provide a credit for taxes paid to other states." In upholding
taxes on the basis of such a credit, the Court has blurred the distinction
between the internal and external consistency tests

9

or ignored it.s°

Thus, simply eliminating the possibility of multiple taxation by providing
a credit for similar taxes paid to other states will satisfy the constitutional
requirement, notwithstanding the absence of any true apportionment or
attempt to reflect in-state activity in the all-or-nothing tax. This step may
not be practicable when a state is maneuvering to tax as large a share
as possible of the net income of national and international enterprises.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 588-89. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983), the Supreme Court enunciated these tests, in the context of a challenge to California's tax
on apportioned worldwide income, as follows:
The first . .. component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might
be called internal consistency-that is, the formula must be such that, if applied
by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business'
income being taxed. The second and more difficult requirement is what might be
called external consistency-the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula
must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.
44. 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
45. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
46. Dissenting in Armco, Justice Rehnquist argued: "Where a State's taxes are linked exactly
to the activities taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical taxing scheme to see if
interstate commerce would be unduly burdened." 467 U.S. at 648 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor argued in American Trucking that: "Creating an 'internal consistency' rule of general
application is an entirely novel enterprise that the Court undertakes for the first time in this case.
Yet the Court gives no reason why such a rule is necessary or desirable[.]" 483 U.S. at 303
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Tyler Pipe, Justice Scalia argued: "Where ... tax is assessed not
on unitary income but on discrete events such as sale, manufacture, and delivery, which can occur
in a single State or in different States, [the] apportionment principle is not applicable; there is
simply no unitary figure or event to apportion." 483 U.S. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
47. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 248 n.16 (discrimination).
48. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at

-,

109 S. Ct. at 590 ("[tlhe ...

taxing scheme is fairly

apportioned, for it provides a credit against its use tax for sales taxes that have been paid in other
States") (quoting D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)). One commentator has
noted that a credit does not really apportion a tax; rather, it is a second-best solution compelled
by the administrative difficulty of allocating retail taxes. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency"
Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MtcH. L.
REv. 138, 182-88 (1988).
49. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. 252.
50. See Holmes, 486 U.S. 24.
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In the case of a sales or gross receipts tax, however, the credit is an
expedient measure since few other states generally will have the nexus
to tax the same transactions."
The 1989 amendment of the New Mexico GRT provides a credit for
similar taxes paid to other states with respect to the sale of R&D services
that would otherwise be taxed in New Mexico." Therefore, the tax on
R&D services performed outside New Mexico is not barred by the constitutional requirement of fair apportionment.
C. Fair Relation
Under this prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, a state tax must
be fairly related to such benefits as "police and fire protection, the
benefit of a trained work force, and 'the advantages of a civilized
society."' 5 3 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana,5 4 however, it has been questionable whether this prong
has any significance independent of the nexus requirement.
Commonwealth Edison involved a challenge to a severance tax on the
grounds of excessiveness. The taxpayer sought an opportunity to prove
the tax was disproportionate to the state's additional costs that resulted
from the taxed activity of mining.55 The Supreme Court stated, however,
that "there is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the
amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must
be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the activity." 5 6 Rather than a comparison of the amount of the tax with the
value of the benefits as measured by the state's costs related to the
taxpayer's activities, the Court said, the test under the fourth prong is
comprised of the nexus test, as a threshold, plus "the additional limitation
that the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of
the contact." ' 57 The rate of the tax, however, is a matter for legislative
58
determination .
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out that under the
majority's view, any ad valorem tax will satisfy the fourth prong. Consequently, he charged, the decision "emasculated" the fourth prong. 9
In truth, although the fourth prong has not been eliminated, recent
decisions barely pay lip service to it. 60 Accordingly, a fair relationship

51. See, e.g., Goldberg, 488 U.S. at -,
109 S. Ct. at 590.
52. See text accompanying note 155.
53. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979)).
54. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id. at 622.
57. Id. at 626.
58. Id. at 627.
59. Id. at 645 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't of Treasury,
109 S. Ct. 1617 (1989); Goldberg, 488 U.S. 252; D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. 24.
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with the taxing state's benefits can be assumed if a tax is ad valorem
and there is nexus.
The tax imposed by the 1989 amendment of the GRT, measured by
sales receipts, is clearly ad valorem. We turn, then, to the final test and
crucial question concerning whether there is substantial nexus to support
the new tax.
D. Nexus
Nexus is determined-for such diverse purposes as taxation and amenability to service of process-on the basis of the nature and extent of
a person's activities or other presence within a state. Since the factual
determinants of nexus vary with the policy considerations peculiar to
each purpose, the case law in one area bears little import for the others.
The issue of nexus to tax, in particular, has generated much Supreme
Court attention over the last several decades. As the following review
demonstrates, constitutional doctrine in this area has matured but remains
subject to change.
Early sales tax cases largely ignored nexus questions and focused instead
on legal distinctions. In McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.,61 a Tennessee
machinery manufacturer received sales orders from Arkansas through
solicitation by traveling salesmen domiciled in Tennessee. The orders were
subject to acceptance by the home office, and the goods were shipped
from Tennessee, with title passing upon delivery to the carrier.62 The
Supreme Court concluded that the Arkansas sales tax was constitutionally
barred because the transfer was made beyond the taxing state's boundaries.,
However, in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa,64
a companion case with similar facts except for a different method of
imposing the tax, the Court upheld an Iowa use tax on goods sent from
Minnesota to purchasers in Iowa, because the use occurred within the
taxing state. The majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter also approvedas "a familiar and sanctioned device"-Iowa's requirement that the
Minnesota vendor collect the tax. 65 In dissent, Justice Jackson. protested
making the out-of-state vendor a tax collector.66
The result in McLeod has become obsolete, since all states with a sales
tax now impose a use tax as well. 67 But the issue raised by Justice Jackson
in General Trading has remained a contentious one, as several cases
discussed infra demonstrate.
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois" involved a gross
receipts tax based on sales to Illinois customers by a Massachusetts

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

322 U.S. 327 (1944).
Id.at 328.
Id. at 330-31.
322 U.S. 335 (1944).
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339 (Jackson, J.,dissenting).
See Willis Report, supra note 12, at 614.
340 U.S. 534 (1951).
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company with a branch office in Chicago. Since the company did some
business at its branch office, the Supreme Court said, it could avoid the
Illinois sales tax "only by showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature." 69 The Court
upheld the tax to the extent it was based on sales that utilized the branch
office, but denied the tax on income from orders sent directly by Illinois
customers to the company's home office in Massachusetts and shipped
directly from Massachusetts to the customers. 70 Notwithstanding the company's substantial activity in Illinois, the Court mandated separate treatment of the sales that did not directly involve that activity.
A decade after General Trading, the Supreme Court revisited the
question of whether an out-of-state vendor can be required to collect a
use tax on behalf of the destination state in Miller Brothers v. Maryland.7 '
On this occasion, Justice Frankfurter's "familiar device" was disallowed
for lack of nexus.
Miller Brothers involved a Delaware company that sold directly to
customers at its furniture store in Wilmington, took no telephone or mail
orders, and had no facilities or representatives in Maryland. When Maryland or Delaware residents made purchases at the store, the furniture
was delivered to them by common carrier or the store's trucks. The store
did not target its media advertising at Maryland residents, though some
advertising reached Maryland residents. Also, Maryland residents received
mailings directed at all past customers of the store.
On these facts, Maryland sought to impose liability on the Delaware
vendor for collection of the Maryland use tax. As the Supreme Court
described Maryland's position, "liability against the Delaware vendor is
predicated7 upon use of the goods in another state and by another
person." '
Writing for a narrow majority, Justice Jackson described nexus, under
the rubric of due process, as "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax. " 73 Stating that the result in General Trading (from which he had
dissented) was justified, he distinguished the instant matter on the grounds
that the earlier case had involved traveling salesmen conducting "continuous local solicitation" -an "active and aggressive operation within
[the] taxing state"-in contrast to "the occasional delivery of goods sold4
at an out-of-state store" without in-state solicitation except incidentally.
A few years later, the Court upheld the liability of an out-of-state
vendor for collection of the use tax in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,7 where
the vendor had "10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen' conducting con-

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
347
Id.
Id.
Id.
362

at 537.
at 538-39.
U.S. 340 (1954).
at 344.
at 344-45.
at 346-47.
U.S. 207 (1960).
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tinuous local solicitation" in the taxing state. 6 The fact that these representatives were not regular full-time employees was deemed to be without
constitutional significance."
In American Oil Co. v. Neill,'7 Idaho taxed a sale of motor fuel in
Utah, on the grounds that the vendor knew the fuel would be used in
Idaho and was licensed to distribute fuel in Idaho.7 9 As to the first of
these grounds, the Supreme Court said it merited little discussion since
the Court will strike down taxes on out-of-state sales when there is
insufficient relation to activities within the taxing state, notwithstanding
the vendor's knowledge of the destined use of goods in that state 0 With
respect to the vendor's Idaho license, the Court said:
[When a corporation, pursuant to permission given, enters a State
and proceeds to do local business the 'link' is strong. In such instances
there is a strong inference that it exists between the State and transactions which result in economic benefits obtained from a source
within the State's territorial limits. The corporation can, however,
exempt itself by a clear showing that there are no in-state activities
connected with out-of-state sales. In such instances, the transactions
are said to be 'dissociated from the local business,' and therefore
may not, consistent with due process, be taxed.'
The Court found no relation between the dealer's activities in Idaho and
the procurement or performance of the contract in question; the mere
possession of an Idaho license did not eliminate the dealer's constitutional
protection. 2
The decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
of Illinois may cost state governments billions of dollars annually by
preventing the states from taxing the mail-order sales of firms that have
no contacts with the taxing states except via mail and common carrier.
In this decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that, for due process and
commerce clause purposes, there is a "sharp distinction . . . between
mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State,
and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the
8
State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business." '
On the basis of this distinction, the Court overturned Illinois' imposition
of use-tax-collection liability on a -firm which, the Court found, had no
representatives, tangible property, or telephone listing in the state. However, a strongly worded dissent contended: "There should be no doubt
that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 211.
Id.
380 U.S. 451 (1965).
Id. at 457.
Id. (citing Miller Brothers, 347 U.S. 340. and McLeod, 322 U.S. 327. inter alia).
Id. at 458 (quoting Norton Co., 340 U.S. at 537).
Id. at 458-59.
386 U.S. 753 (1967).
Id. at 758.
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of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient 'nexus' to require [collection
of the use tax]." 85
In the two decades since National Bellas Hess was decided, the volume
of mail-order sales has grown substantially as a result of the effectively
tax-free status 8 6 and convenience of this computer- and telephone-assisted
method of merchandising. The dissent's characterization of the mail-order
market has become more compelling, and there continues to be a strong
call for overturning National Bellas Hess judicially or legislatively. 87 However, it remains as true today as two decades ago that the Supreme Court
"has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection
and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the
State is by common carrier or the United States mail." 88
The National Bellas Hess rule was recently affirmed in Goldberg v.
Sweet,8 9 in which the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois tax on interstate
telecommunications that originate or terminate in Illinois and are charged
to an Illinois service address. Nexus was not at issue in Goldberg because
of the local service address. However, the Court noted its "doubt that
termination of an interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial
enough nexus for a State to tax a call[,]" citing National Bellas Hess,
which the Court characterized
as holding that "receipt of mail provides
9
insufficient nexus."
Pennsylvania and Connecticut courts have recently defeated attempts
by the revenue departments of those states to require out-of-state mailorder firms to collect use taxes. In Bloomingdale's By Mail, Ltd. v.
Commonwealth Department of Revenue, 9' a wholly-owned New York
subsidiary (By Mail) of Federated Department Stores (Federated) conducted a nationwide mail-order business from locations in Virginia and
Connecticut. The Pennsylvania court concluded that By Mail, as a separate
corporate entity, had insufficient nexus for Pennsylvania to require collection of its use tax. The court found it immaterial that, contrary to
By Mail's direction that returns be mailed to Virginia, employees of the
Department of Revenue were able on two occasions to return mail-order
purchases to Bloomingdale's retail stores operated in Pennsylvania as a
92
Federated division.

85. Id. at 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
86. Though mail-order purchases are subject to use taxes whether or not the vendors act as
collection agents, it is not administratively practical to collect the taxes after the point of sale.
87. See, e.g., Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND.
L. REv. 993 (1986).
88. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757-58.
89. 488 U.S. 252, 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989).
90. Id. at __
109 S. Ct. at 589-90. See also Evanston Insurance Co. v. Merin, 598 F. Supp.
1290, 1306 (D.N.J. 1984) (concluding, after a review of National Bellas Hess and several decisions
upholding taxes, that "[tlhe critical threshold for triggering a state's power to tax is . . . whether
or not the out-of-state enterprise stations agents or establishes offices to conduct any business in
the taxing state").
91. 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
92. See Bloomingdale's By Aail, 567 A.2d at 777-78; see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Dep't of Revenue, 516 A.2d 820 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
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Cally Curtis Co. v. Gropo 93 involved a California company (Curtis)
that sold and rented training films to Connecticut customers. The customers mailed their orders to California, and Curtis delivered the films
by common carrier or mail. Customers could examine the films for three
days before deciding whether to purchase or rent, and none of the rentals

exceeded three days. "Curtis had no telephone in Connecticut, nor any
property in Connecticut other than the films previewed or rented, and
Curtis did not visit its customers in Connecticut."' 9

The Connecticut

Supreme Court found these facts "remarkably similar" to those of
National Bellas Hess and upheld a lower court's finding of insufficient

nexus to require collection of the Connecticut use tax by Curtis. The
court
discern(ed] no significant difference between a sale and a three day
preview or lease of the films.... Although Curtis did have property
(films) within Connecticut, such contact with Connecticut ... was
de minimis, as the' films were only in the state for three day periods,
and did not benefit from the services of local government.95
Although National Bellas Hess remains in effect, the New Mexico
Taxation and Revenue Department (Department) recently declared outof-state mail-order firms are subject to the GRT because, under the
Uniform Commercial Code, the sales take place upon the buyers' acceptance of the goods in New Mexico. The Department asserted that
focusing on state law regarding the locus of mail-order sales "resolves
all due process and commerce clause issues" since the Supreme Court
recognized in National Bellas Hess that the presence of the taxpayer's
property or the transaction in the taxing state provides "the 'minimum
connection' between the state and the taxpayer necessary to justify the
imposition of tax."9
The Department maintains that goods shipped into New Mexico remain
the property of the out-of-state seller while being delivered in New Mexico
and while in the possession of a New Mexico buyer as long as the goods
may be returned for full refund.Y Following this reasoning, goods that
may be returned if the buyer is dissatisfied remain the seller's property
at least until the buyer fails to act after a reasonable opportunity for
inspection, if no return deadline is specified. 98 When the buyer accepts
the goods by failing to return them, the sale takes place in New Mexico. 99
On this premise, the Department proposed Regulation GR 3(F):85,
which provides in part: "An out-of-state mail-order or direct-marketing

93. 572 A.2d 302 (Conn. 1990).
94. Id. at 304.
95. Id. at 306; see also SFA Folio Collections, Inc.. No. CV 87-0338611 (Conn. Sup. April 20,
1990) (summarized in State Tax Review (CCH), May 15, 1990, at 7-8).
96. See New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, Explanation: GR 3(E):4 and GR 3(F):85
(April 16, 1990) (Department Explanation) at 2-3.

97. See id. at 3.

98. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-2-326 and -606(1)(b).
99. See Department Explanation at 3.
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seller who regularly ships goods to New Mexico customers is engaging
in business in New Mexico and shall pay gross receipts tax on receipts
from all sales which occur in New Mexico."'0
In its effort to harmonize imposition of the GRT on out-of-state mailorder firms with the rule of National Bellas Hess, the Department has
misread the Supreme Court decision. Although the Court stated that "the
Constitution requires 'some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to
tax[,]" ' 01 the Court illustrated this principle with examples of out-ofstate sellers that had representatives or retail stores in the taxing states.
The Court specifically distinguished as not subject to taxation sellers
whose only connection is by common carrier or mail, quoting an earlier
decision that out-of-state mail-order houses "are not receiving benefits
from Iowa for which it has the power to exact a price."'0 2 Further, in
distinguishing between mail-order firms "with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a state" and firms "who do no more than communicate
with customers in the state by mail or common carrier[,]"' 13 the Supreme
Court clearly recognized the possibility of conducting a mail-order business
that does not involve nexus with the destination state.
The Department's position, however, would virtually deny this possibility. In fact, the Department's position obliterates the distinction drawn
by the Supreme Court in National Bellas Hess and reduces this decision
to a nullity by using a general statement in the opinion to undo its
specific conclusion.
Consequently, a court applying NationalBellas Hess to the Department's
proposed regulation is likely to find that the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code fixing the moment of sale are irrelevant for the purpose
of establishing nexus, or, following the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Calley Curtis, that property consisting of goods pending acceptance is a
de minimis contact insufficient to establish nexus for imposition of the
GRT.
4
In National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization,
the Supreme Court took a step back from its tax-overturning holdings
in Miller Brothers and National Bellas Hess. The Society's presence in
California consisted of two offices maintained to solicit advertising for
its monthly magazine; these offices performed no activities related to a
mail-order business operated by the Society from the District of Columbia. 015 Thus, the Society had a National Bellas Hess situation for its
mail orders, but also an unrelated in-state activity. California sought to

100. St. Tax Rep. (N.M.) (CCH),
_. The regulation was proposed on April 16, 1990, and
will become effective January 1, 1991.
101. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340,
344-45 (1954)).
102. Id. at 757-58 (quoting Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1941)).
103. Id.at 758.
104. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
105. Id. at 552.
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require the Society to collect a use tax based on mail-order sales to
Californians.
The Supreme Court refused to accept the California court's "'slightest
presence' standard of constitutional nexus," but found the Society's two
offices constituted more than the slightest presence in the state.' 6 More
important, the Supreme Court declared that the absence of nexus between
the taxed activity and the in-state activity might be fatal to a direct
tax, 17 citing Norton and American Oil, but a "use-tax-collection duty"
required only nexus between the vendor and the taxing state.1°8 The Court
provided no explanation for this distinction, and it appears to be a relic
of the formalism that had been abandoned in Complete Auto Transit
just a month earlier. In any event, the Court retained the requirement
that transactional nexus, between the taxed activity and the in-state
activity, is necessary to tax the vendor directly.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion pointed out that Miller Brothers,
a use-tax-collection case in which the vendor sent its delivery trucks into
the taxing state, was not truly distinguishable from National Geographic,
though the Court failed to overturn the earlier case.' °9 Even if Miller
Brothers had been overruled, however, the requirement of transactional
nexus for direct taxation, as opposed to use tax collection, would not
have been. affected.
The decision in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue"0 dealt primarily with the discrimination prong of
the Complete Auto Transit test"' but also provides current guidance on
nexus. Tyler Pipe's presence in the state of Washington consisted of a
sales representative who was an independent, contractor." 2 Following its
analysis in Scripto, the Supreme Court found the distinction between
employees and independent contractors to be without constitutional significance.1" The Court also gave its imprimatur to this statement by the
Washington Supreme Court: '[T]he crucial factor governing nexus is
whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer
are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ' ability
to establish and
4
maintain a market in this state for the sales."'

106. Id. at 556.
107. Id. at 560. A direct tax might be, for example, a gross receipts tax.
108. Id.at 560-61.
109. Id. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J.,concurring). Indeed, several state courts have concluded that
Miller Brothers was "eroded" by National Geographic and have found furniture dealers who made
regular deliveries into neighboring states in company-owned trucks were subject to the use-taxcollection duties imposed by the destination states. See Good's Furniture House, Inc. v. Iowa State
Board of Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Iowa 1986); Cooey-Bentz Co. v. Lindley, 419 N.E.2d
1087 (Ohio 1981); In re State Sales or Use Tax Liability of Webber Furniture, Scottsbluff. Nebraska,
290 N.W.2d 865 (S.D. 1980); Rowe-Genereux, Inc. v. Vermont Dep't of Taxes, 411 A.2d 1345 (Vt.
1980).
110. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
111. See supra text accompanying note 38.
112. 483 U.S. at 249.
113. Id.at 250.
114. Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 105 Wash. 2d 318, 323,
715 P.2d 123, 126 (1986)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 20

The Supreme Court's most recent nexus decision in the area of state
taxation was D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara,"1 5 which unanimously
upheld Louisiana's imposition of a use tax on catalogs that were published
out of state and mailed to Louisiana residents. The publisher of the
catalog owned thirteen department stores in Louisiana. The Court found
'nexus' aplenty" where the distribution of catalogs was intended to
expand the company's Louisiana business."1 6 Though the tax was imposed
directly on the vendor, there was nexus between the taxed activity (distribution of catalogs) and the in-state activity (operation of department
stores), as well as nexus between the vendor and the taxing state. Thus,
the result seems clearly encompassed by National Geographic and distinguishable from National Bellas Hess.
In summary, though nexus has a know-it-when-I-see-it quality in common with other constitutional concepts, it is not a difficult notion, and
the Supreme Court has provided guidelines that should resolve most
questions in this area. After describing the main features of. New Mexico's
Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act and 1989 amendment of the
GRT, we shall apply the Court's nexus guidelines to the amendment.
IV.
A.

NEW MEXICO'S GROSS RECEIPTS AND COMPENSATING
TAX
General Provisions

1. Gross Receipts Tax
The statement of purpose of the Tax Act" 7 and the imposition of the
tax on gross receipts"" establish the GRT as a levy on the privilege of
engaging in business in New Mexico, imposed on persons so engaged."19
The GRT is measured by the gross receipts from selling and leasing
property in New Mexico, performing services in New Mexico,' 20 and,
under the 1989 amendment, selling certain services performed outside
New Mexico. 121
115. 486 U.S. 24 (1988).
116. Id. at 33. In a recent New Mexico decision involving similar facts, the court upheld imposition
of the use tax on statutory grounds. See Phillips Mercantile Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and
Revenue Dep't, 109 N.M. 487, 786 P.2d 1221 (Ct. App. 1990).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1988) provides:
The purpose of the [Tax Act] is to provide revenue for public purposes by levying
a tax on the privilege of engaging in certain activities within New Mexico and to
protect New Mexico businessmen from the unfair competition that would otherwise
result from the importation into the state of property without payment of a similar
tax.
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1988) provides: "For the privilege of engaging
in business, an excise tax equal to four and three-fourths percent of gross receipts is imposed on
any person engaging in business in New Mexico."
119. See Proficient Food Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 107 N.M. 392, 393,
758 P.2d 806, 807 (Ct. App. 1988).
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-3(F) and -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
121. Id. § 7-9-3(F) (Supp. 1989).
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2.

Use Tax
The Tax Act also imposes a compensating tax, at the same rate as
the GRT, on the privilege of using property or services rendered in New
Mexico, if the property escaped the GRT'2 because the user manufactured
it in New Mexico or acquired it outside the state,12 or the services were
rendered in a transaction that was not initially subject to the GRT but
later became so.'24 The compensating tax does not apply to .the use of
a service that was performed outside New Mexico. 25 Although the use
tax accounts for relatively small collections,
it serves as a necessary adjunct
26
to prevent easy avoidance of the GRT.
Since the use tax on most items purchased from out-of-state sellers is
unlikely to be paid unless it is collected at the point of sale,' 12 out-of-

state sellers who have
some presence in New Mexico are designated as
28
use tax collectors.

122. See Proficient Food, 107 N.M. at 397, 758 P.2d at 811 ("the compensating tax applies only
when gross receipts cannot be collected").
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1988). A credit against the use tax is provided
for the payment of gross receipts, sales or similar taxes to another state in which the property was
acquired. Id. § 7-9-79(A).
124. Id. § 7-9-7(B). This situation might arise if an out-of-state buyer made initial use of the
product of the services in New Mexico or took delivery of the product in New Mexico. See text
accompanying notes 149-52.
125. See N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dept. G. R. Reg. 7:3, St. Tax Rep. (N.M.) (CCH),
65609.
126. See Willis Report, supra note 12, at 617. "[T]he compensating tax functions as an enforcement
mechanism for the gross receipts tax(.]" United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 727 (1982).
See generally McCloud, Sales and Use Tax: Historical Developments and Differing Features, 22
DuQ. L. REv. 823 (1984).
127. Automobiles are an exception: the unavoidable encounter with the Motor Vehicle Division
to effect registration provides an opportunity for the state to exact the use tax on vehicles purchased
outside New Mexico.
128. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-10(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1988), as amended by 1990 N.M. Laws ch. 41,
requires collection of the use tax by persons who engage in any of the following activities in New
Mexico:
[Maintaining an office or other place of business, soliciting orders through employees
or independent contractors, soliciting orders through advertisements placed in newspapers or magazines published in New Mexico or advertisements broadcast by New
Mexico radio or television stations, soliciting orders through programs broadcast
by New Mexico radio or television stations or transmitted by cable systems in New
Mexico, canvassing, demonstrating, collecting money, warehousing or storing merchandise or delivering or distributing products as a consequence of an advertising
or other sales program directed at potential customers.
(Emphasis added to denote 1990 amendment.)
Most of the activities on this list accord with Supreme Court decisions upholding states' impositions
of a use-tax-collection duty. See. e.g., National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization,
430 U.S. 551 (1977); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). However, advertising has not
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court as a sole basis for requiring collection of a use tax. The
1990 amendment, which could require tax collection on the lone ground of solicitation through
advertisements published in New Mexico newspapers or magazines, or broadcast on New Mexico
radio or TV stations, apparently relies on decisions related to the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1990)
(upholding application of the Oklahoma long-arm statute against a Florida hotel that advertised in
Oklahoma). In the face of a well-developed body of constitutional law dealing specifically with
states' authority to require tax collection by foreigners, the applicability to the tax area of decisions
concerning long-arm jurisdiction is dubious. Some solicitations covered by the 1990 amendment,
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29

A savings clause in the Tax Act provides that receipts from interstate
transactions are deductible to the extent the imposition of the GRT would
be unconstitutional. 30 Also deductible are receipts from interstate sales
of services performed in New Mexico,' 3' which could be taxed if New
Mexico chose to do so, 3 2 since the performance of the services in New

Mexico establishes nexus, and a tax on the value of services performed

within a state is considered to be properly apportioned.' 33
Receipts from sales of tangible personal property to the federal and

state governments,'4 organizations exempt from the federal income tax
under IRC § 501(c)(3),1 J5 and federal contractors or subcontractors 3 6 are
also deductible. However, receipts from sales of services to such public
and private entities are not deductible or exempt.'
To avoid pyramiding the GRT by taxing at more than one level of
production and distribution, sales of property to be incorporated in a
manufactured product 3 ' and sales of property or services to be resold,
leased (property only) or incorporated in a construction project'39 are
"grossed up," i.e., deducted when sold to the manufacturer, retailer or
construction contractor, but reflected in the taxable receipts from the
subsequent sale to the consumer of the manufactured item, retail product
or construction project.
Receipts of the federal and New Mexico state governments and 501(c)(3)
organizations are exempt from the GRT,1'4 and such entities are also
exempt from the compensating tax.' 4 ' Also, 2receipts from an isolated or
occasional sale are exempt from the GRT.'1

e.g., local broadcasts of national network advertising, do not constitute adequate nexus for requiring
tax collection, while solicitations in which foreign advertisers contract directly with New Mexico
media for sales campaigns in the state might provide a constitutional basis for imposing the taxcollection obligation on the advertisers.
129. Deductions, which generally require a Nontaxable Transaction Certificate issued by the buyer
to the seller, are included in gross receipts for reporting purposes but subtracted to determine taxable
gross receipts. Exemptions from the GRT are not reported at all. See New Mexico Taxation and
Revenue Department, Introduction to CRS 2.
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-55 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
131. Id. § 7-9-57 (Supp. 1989).
132. See Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
133. See Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 737
(1978).
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54 (Supp. 1989).
135. Id. § 7-9-60 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
136. See N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dept. Reg. G. R. 47:31, St. Tax Rep. (N.M.) (CCH)
66-585.
137. This distinction may be based, in part, on the assumption that a purchaser located in New
Mexico can more easily acquire tangible personal property than services outside New Mexico. Thus,
if the GRT were imposed on the sale of tangible personal property to the government, federal
entities could shift their purchases of such property to sources outside New Mexico and thereby
avoid having to reimburse the GRT. Conversely, the location of construction services cannot be
shifted.
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-46 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
139. Id. §§ 7-9-47 through -52.
140. See id. § 7-9-13 (governments) and § 7-9-29 (501(c)(3) organizations).
141. See id. § 7-9-14 (governments) and § 7-9-15 (501(c)(3) organizations).
142. Id. § 7-9-28. In Besser Co. v. Bureau of Revenue. 74 N.M. 377, 382, 394 P.2d 141, 146
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4.

Federal Immunity
The exemptions. of federal government receipts and uses are mandated
by the supremacy clause, 43 which grants "absolute federal immunity from
state taxation."'" Federal immunity does not extend, however, to contractors who provide services to the government, even if the government
reimburses the contractors' payment of the GRT on the services. 45 Nor
does federal immunity extend to the contractors who manage the national
laboratories for the federal government in New Mexico or elsewhere; the
contractors are considered independent taxable entities.'4
B.

The 1989 Amendment

1. Taxation of Imported Services
The 1989 amendment added receipts "from selling services performed
outside New Mexico the product of which is initially used in New Mexico"
to the definition of "gross receipts" under the Tax Act. 14 7 Thus, the
amendment applies the GRT to persons performing, and services per-

(1964), the court determined that even a few leases of equipment in New Mexico constituted engaging
in business in New Mexico and did not qualify for the "occasional sale" exemption, if the leasing
was "in line with the business for which the [lessor] .. . was organized and in which it engages."
Similarly, in Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 78 N.M. 78, 81, 428 P.2d
617, 620 (1966), the court, citing Besser, found that performing a contract in New Mexico as often
as the circumstances demanded was engaging in business in New Mexico, though most of the work
under the contract was done outside New Mexico. Under these decisions, minor or infrequent
business activities performed in New Mexico may constitute engaging in business in New Mexico;
the nature, not the level, of the activity determines whether it constitutes engaging in business in
New Mexico. See also N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dept. G. R. Reg. 28:1, St. Tax. Rep. (N.M.)

(CCH)

66-115.

Other exemptions and deductions include wages, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1988),
dividends and interest, id. § 7-9-25, and sale or lease of real property (except by a construction
contractor), id. § 7-9-53.
143. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl.2.
144. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733 (1982).
145. Id. at 735; see also James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 150 (1937). The Supreme
Court recently decribed this limitation on federal immunity as follows: "[Tihe States can never tax
the United States directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does business, even though
the financial burden falls on the United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against
the United States or those with whom it deals." California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra
Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2228, 2232 (1989) (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523
(1988)). Similarly, contractors' sales of tangible personal property to the federal government are
not immune, but New Mexico does not impose the GRT on such sales. See supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
146. Immunity applies only to a tax levied directly on the United States "or on an agency or
instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed
as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned." Sierra Summit, 109
S. Ct. at 2232 (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 735).
However, the receipts of the University of California for managing Los Alamos National Laboratory
are exempt as receipts of a 501(cX3) organization. See note 140 and accompanying text. The receipts
of sellers of tangible personal property to the University in such capacity are deductible as receipts
from sales to a 501(c)(3) organization. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3(F) (Supp. 1989). The addition to the definition was originally
made effective for the four-year period that commenced July 1, 1989. 1989 N.M. Laws Ch. 262.
Subsequently, the amended definition was continued indefinitely. 1990 N.M. Laws Ch. 27.
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formed, outside New Mexico. On the face of the amendment, the only
connection between New Mexico, on the one hand, and the services and
service provider, on the other, is the "initial use" in New Mexico of
the product of the services. However, the tax is imposed on the out-ofstate sale and seller of the services; neither the use nor the user of the
services is taxed.14 As discussed in Part V, constitutional limitations and
provisions of the Tax Act itself sharply circumscribe the application of
the 1989 amendment.
2.

Expanded Deduction for Exported Services
Prior to the 1989 amendment, the Tax Act provided a deduction for
sales of services performed in New Mexico if the buyer did not: (1) make
initial use of the product of the services in New Mexico, (2) take delivery
of the product of the services in New Mexico, or (3) have a regular
place of work or spend more than brief and occasional periods of time
in New Mexico concurrent with the performance of the services, and
either (a) communicate in New Mexico with the service provider regarding
149
the services, or (b) perform work in New Mexico related to the services.
New Mexico service providers facing price competition from service
providers in states that do not tax sales of services convinced the legislature
that the deduction for services purchased by out-of-state buyers was too
narrow and its application too uncertain to encourage the export of
services. In addition, an expansive interpretation of the term "initial use"
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals limited the scope of the deduction. 510
The 1989 amendment responded to these problems by eliminating the
third condition for disallowance of the export deduction' and establishing
a restrictive definition of "initial use" that excludes incidental and preliminary uses,' 52 thereby expanding the availability of the deduction to

148. The compensating tax on services is explicitly limited to the use of services that have been
performed in New Mexico. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.

149. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 7-9-57 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).

150. See Reed v. Jones, 81 N.M. 481, 468 P.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1970). This case involved a truck
driven to Roswell from Amarillo for repairs. The court found that the return trip to Texas constituted
initial use in New Mexico of the product of the repair service, thereby eliminating the deduction
from the GRT for sales of services to out-of-state buyers. A dissent would have limited the term
"use" to employment for the owner's purpose or objective, i.e., making deliveries in Texas. Id.
at 884 (Spiess, C.J., dissenting). The 1989 amendment codified the dissent's view by defining "initial
use" as first employment "for the intended purpose." See infra note 152. However, the result in
Reed would be the same under the current statute, since the truck owner took delivery in New
Mexico of the "product" of the repair service.

151. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 7-9-57(C) (Supp. 1989).

152. The definition provides that "initial use"
means the first employment for the intended purpose and does not include the
following activities:
(I) observation of tests conducted by the performer of services;
(2) participation in progress reviews, briefings, consultations and conferences conducted by the performer of services;
(3) review of preliminary drafts, drawings and other materials prepared by the
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New Mexico sellers of services to out-of-state buyers during the fouryear effective period of the amendment.
3.

Limitations
Through a complicated sequence of exemptions,' the extension of the
GRT under the 1989 amendment applies only to research and development
services5 4 performed outside New Mexico. To avoid multiple taxation,
the amendment provides a credit for sales or similar taxes paid to another
6
state,' e.g., the state where the services were performed."
V.

IS THE GRT ON SERVICES PERFORMED OUTSIDE NEW
MEXICO UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

Before addressing this question of constitutionality, two related statutory
matters must be addressed: the effect of a savings provision contained

performer of the services;
(4) inspection of preliminary prototypes developed by the performer of services; or
(5) similar activities[.]
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3(0) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). These exclusions may enable an outof-state purchaser to monitor the performance of a contract in New Mexico without subjecting-the
seller to the GRT. Publication 105, "Research and Development Information" (undated), a publication
of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, provides no assistance in interpreting the
expanded deduction under the 1989 amendment.
153. The amended definition of "gross receipts" includes receipts from "selling services performed
outside New Mexico the product of which is initially used in New Mexico," N.M. STAT. ANN. §
7-9-3(F) (Supp. 1989); however, all such receipts are excluded from the GRT, id. § 7-9-13.1(A);
but the exclusion does not apply to R&D services, id. § 7-9-13.1(B). Further exemptions exclude
out-of-state R&D services sold (1)between affiliates, (2) by Sandia National Laboratories to the
federal government, or (3) to Sandia National Laboratories. Id. § 7-9-13.1(B)(I)-(3). Sandia National
Laboratories is not named in the legislation but exclusively occupies the designated category of New
Mexico persons, other than nonprofit organizations, who are prime contractors operating national
laboratories in New Mexico.
154. The amendment defines "research and development services" as:
[A]ny activity engaged in for other persons for consideration, for one or more of
the following purposes:
(1) advancing basic knowledge in a recognized field of natural science;
(2) advancing technology in a field of technical endeavor;
(3) the development of a new or improved product, process or system with new
or improved function, performance, reliability or quality, whether or not the new
or improved product, process or system is offered for sale, lease or other transfer;
(4) the development of new uses or applications for an existing product, process
or system, whether or not the new use or application is offered as the rationale
for purchase, lease or other transfer of the product, process or system;
(5) analytical or survey activities incorporating technology review, application, tradeoff study, modelling, simulation, conceptual design or similar activities, whether or
not offered for sale, lease or other transfer; or
(6) the design and development of prototypes or the integration of systems incorporating advances, developments or improvements included in Paragraphs (I) through
(5) of this subsection.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3.P (Supp. 1989).
155. Id. § 7-9-79.1.
156. Also, the 1989 amendment provides a credit for additional GRT (less $1000) that results
from the adoption of the amendment and is due on a contract entered into prior to July 1, 1989,
provided the contract does not allow the taxpayer to obtain reimbursement for the additional GRT.
Id. § 7-9-3 note (Temporary Provisions).
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in the Tax Act and the imposition of the GRT on persons "engaging
in business in New Mexico."
A.

Savings Provision
Since a savings provision of the Tax Act permits a deduction from
gross receipts to the extent imposition of the GRT would be unconstitutional, 5 7 the statute is self-limited to constitutional impositions of the
GRT. Thus, the constitutional question to be resolved is: under what
conditions would imposing the GRT on an out-of-state service provider
be barred by the Constitution and, through operation of the savings
provision, by the Tax Act as well?
B.

"Engaging in Business in New Mexico"
The imposition of the GRT "on any person engaging in business in
New Mexico"' raises a parallel question. Since the 1989 amendment did
not alter this fundamental provision of the Tax Act, the extension of
the GRT to the sale of R&D services performed outside New Mexico
will apply only if the service provider is engaging in business in New
Mexico. Thus, the application of the GRT raises a statutory question
that courts might consider before reaching the constitutional issue: when
is an out-of-state service provider "engaging in business in New Mexico"?
For obvious reasons, this statutory standard is circumscribed by the
limitations of the commerce clause. New Mexico cannot by statute extend
its tax reach beyond constitutional boundaries. On the other hand, New
Mexico is unlikely to restrict its tax reach within the constitutional
boundaries, at least with respect to out-of-state firms. It is a safe assumption that the legislature intended to export the GRT to the extent
constitutionally permissible. Thus, for practical purposes, the statutory
standard is equivalent to the constitutional standard.
Indeed, the most recent judicial determination of whether an out-ofstate firm was engaging in business in New Mexico resolved this issue
through constitutional analysis. In Proficient Food Co. v. New Mexico
Taxation and Revenue Department,'9 a California company protested the
imposition of the GRT on its sales of supplies to New Mexico restaurant
chains. The supplier did not maintain a place of business in New Mexico,
none of its representatives resided in New Mexico, and the sales were
both invoiced and paid outside New Mexico. However, the company
solicited sales in New Mexico by telephone, service representatives sometimes traveled in New Mexico to respond to customers' complaints, and
the company delivered supplies in its own trucks from a warehouse in
Texas to the restaurants in New Mexico.16

157. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-55 (Repl. Pamp. 1988), provides: "Receipts from transactions in
interstate commerce may be deducted from gross receipts to the extent that the imposition of the
gross receipts tax would be unlawful under the United States Constitution."
158. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
159. 107 N.M. 392, 758 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1988).
160. Id. at 393, 758 P.2d at 807.
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The company apparently attempted to come within the holding in Miller
Brothers'6' by arguing that it was not engaged in business in New Mexico
because its activities in the state were limited to deliveries.16 2 The court
found, however, that the company failed to establish that the travels of
its representatives and telephone solicitations, in addition to the in-state
deliveries, were not "decisive factors in establishing and holding its New
Mexico market." 63 The court concluded that New Mexico had jurisdiction
to impose the GRT on the company's New Mexico sales, citing Tyler
6
Pipe'6 and General Trading,165 and distinguishing National Bellas Hess' 6
67
and Miller Brothers. Thus, the ostensible statutory issue as to whether
the company was engaging in business in New Mexico was resolved
exclusively by reference to constitutional holdings.'6
C.

Testing for Nexus
Speaking for a near-unanimous court in American Oil, Chief Justice
Warren noted the "firmly established doctrine" that "when a tax is
imposed on an out-of-state vendor, 'nexus' between the taxing State and
' 69
the taxpayer is the outstanding prerequisite on state power to tax.'
Thus, nexus is the crucial element of the Complete Auto Transit test in
determining whether, or under what circumstances, imposing the GRT
on the sale of services performed outside New Mexico would violate the
commerce and due process clauses.
The GRT on out-of-state services is imposed on the seller of the services,
as distinguished from a use tax that an out-of-state seller may be required
to collect but is actually imposed on in-state buyers. Therefore, the more
rigorous of the two nexus standards discussed in National Geographic is
applicable. 7 0 In order for the GRT on the sale of out-of-state services
to satisfy the nexus requirement, there must be nexus not only between
the service provider and New Mexico, but also between the out-of-state
performance of R&D services on which the7 GRT is imposed and the
service provider's activities in New Mexico.' '

161. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (see supra text accompanying notes 71-74).
162. Proficient Food, 107 N.M. at 394, 758 P.2d at 808.
163. Id. at 395, 758 P.2d at 809 (citing Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S.
534 (1951)) (see supra text accompanying notes 68-70).
164. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (see
supra text accompanying notes 36-38).
165. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) (see supra text
accompanying notes 64-66).
166. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (see
supra text accompanying notes 83-103).
167. Miller Brothers, 347 U.S. 340 (see supra text accompanying notes 71-74).
168. Proficient Food, 107 N.M. 392, 758 P.2d 806; see also AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 93 N.M. 389, 600 P.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1979).
169. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 458 (1960) (see supra text accompanying notes
78-82).
170. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
171. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560-61
(1977).
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Consider several situations in which the nexus standards might be
applied:
(1) A California R&D firm owns no property and maintains no place
of business or representatives in New Mexico; the R&D firm responds
to a published request for proposals and, by mail and telephone,
negotiates a contract with a New Mexico buyer for the performance
of R&D services; the R&D firm then performs the R&D services in
California and mails the "deliverable"-a report-to the buyer in
New Mexico.
(2) Same facts as Situation (1) except the R&D firm maintains an
office in New Mexico to provide services to another client; the New
Mexico office plays no role in obtaining or performing the R&D
contract in question.
(3) Same facts as Situation (1), except an employee of the R&D firm
occasionally travels from California to New Mexico to confer with
the buyer about the contract.
(4) Same facts as Situation (2), except the R&D firm mails the final
report to its New Mexico office, which delivers the report to the
buyer.
(5) Same facts as Situation (2), except the R&D firm's New Mexico
office was involved in soliciting the contract to be performed in
California.
(6) Same facts as Situation (2), except the R&D firm's California and
New Mexico facilities each perform a portion of the contract.
These situations are intended to illustrate: (1) no activity in New Mexico
by the R&D firm; (2) no activity in New Mexico related to the contract
in question; (3) and (4) minor activities in New Mexico related to the
contract; (5) activities in New Mexico related to the solicitation of the
contract; and (6) activities in both New Mexico and California related
to the performance of the contract.
Situation (1): This situation involves even less presence by the seller
in the taxing state than National Bellas Hess, in which the Supreme
Court overturned Illinois' attempt to require collection of use taxes by
a mail-order firm whose sole contacts with Illinois were by mail and
common carrier.' 2 Not even the "large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the [in-state] consumer market"-noted by
the dissent in National Bellas Hess-is present in this situation. Instead,
the R&D firm, making limited use of interstate instrumentalities, performs
the entire contract in California. The result of the services is a report,
prepared in California and mailed to New Mexico. Thus, the R&D firm
has virtually no connection with New Mexico.
Can the buyer provide the necessary connection for New Mexico to
tax the California firm? Or, in the terms of the 1989 amendment, is the
buyer's initial use in New Mexico of the product of the services performed
in California accorded any constitutional significance?

172. See supra text accompanying notes 83-103.

Summer 1990]

TAX ON OUT-OF-STATE SERVICES

In responding to these questions, it should be noted, first, that the
1989 amendment imposes the GRT on receipts from selling R&D services
performed outside New Mexico, not on receipts from selling any product
of those services or other property.'
In short, the tax is imposed on
the services, not the product thereof. In the case of R&D services, the
product may be knowledge, a design or an invention, and it may be
physically manifested in a report or prototype or not at all. 7 ' In any
event, the product is merely an artifact of the services that are the subject
of the sale. Accordingly, concepts normally employed to determine tax
jurisdiction over sales of property, such as delivery and transfer of title,
should have little relevance in this context.
Furthermore, the tax imposed by the 1989 amendment on out-of-state
services is a sales tax imposed on the seller, not a use tax imposed on
the buyer. The use of the product of services performed outside New
Mexico does not trigger the compensating tax imposed on the use of
property purchased outside the state."'5 The buyer's use of the product
is quite independent of the seller's performance of services and, indeed,
occurs after the seller has completed its role in the transaction.
Common sense dictates that the buyer's activities-whether they involve
initial or final use of the product of services-cannot establish the seller's
nexus. Only in-state activities by the seller may constitute sufficient
connection to permit a state to tax the seller, 7 6 and the buyer's receipt
or use in New Mexico of the product of the seller's out-of-state services
does not establish nexus.'" A conclusion to the contrary would ignore
the seller's circumstances and make a shambles of constitutional protection
against state taxation, by treating any out-of-state service provider as
engaged in business within the taxing state-and therefore unprotected
by the commerce and due process clauses-merely because the product
of the seller's services is used in that state.

173. Thus, the 1989 amendment avoids earlier disputes in which out-of-state vendors sought to
characterize transactions as sales of services rather than property, in order to avoid the GRT. See,
e.g., Advance Schools, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 89 N.M. 79, 547 P.2d 562 (1976) (correspondence
school's transactions with New Mexico students were primarily sales of services rather than property,
-and therefore not subject to the GRT because performed outside New Mexico). To resolve such
disputes, New Mexico adopted the "predominant ingredient test" employed by the majority of
states. The Tax Act defines "service" as "activities involv[ing] predominantly the performance of
a service as distinguished from selling or leasing property." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3.K (Supp.
1989). The definition also provides that "[i]n determining what is a service, the intended use,
principal objective or ultimate objective of the contracting parties shall not be controlling." Id.
Thus, the statute focuses on the "seller's relative investment of skills and materials" rather than
the "end product's value to the purchaser." E G & G, Inc. v. Director, Revenue Div., Taxation
and Revenue Dep't, 94 N.M. 143, 145, 607 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Phillips
Mercantile Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 109 N.M. 487, -,
786 P.2d 1221,
1224 (Ct.Ap. 1990). If the investment of skills exceeds that of materials, the transaction is considered
a sale of services, not a sale of whatever is produced by the services.
174. For the definition of "research and development services," see supra note 154.
175. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
177. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
-,
109 S. Ct. 582, 589 (1989); National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)
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Thus, in Situation (1) neither the seller nor the transaction has sufficient
nexus with New Mexico to support the imposition of the GRT on the
California R&D firm. Even if the Supreme Court were to overturn
National Bellas Hess on the grounds suggested by the dissent in that
case, the absence of continuous solicitation by the seller would preserve
the same result in Situation (1).
Situation (2): Although in this situation the R&D firm has local activities
in New Mexico, these activities are unrelated to the out-of-state R&D
services on which the GRT is levied. In Norton and American Oil, such
out-of-state activities were described as "dissociated from the local business" and therefore protected from taxation by the due process clause.' 8s
To the same effect, the decision in National Geographic requires nexus
between the taxed activity and the in-state activity in the case of a direct
tax such as the GRT.' 79 In the absence of any nexus with the taxed
activity in Situation (2), New Mexico's imposition of the GRT on the
California R&D firm would be unconstitutional.
Situations (3) and (4): In these situations, the R&D firm has incidental
minor activities in New Mexico related to the performance of the R&D
services in California. These incidental activities are too insubstantial to
establish nexus between New Mexico and the performance of services in
California under the standard approved in Tyler Pipe that recognizes
only activities "significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to
establish and maintain a market in [the taxing] state ...... ",0 Occasional
professional visits are unlikely to satisfy this standard,' 8' and the onetime delivery of the report resembles "the occasional delivery of goods
sold at an out-of-state store" that was found insufficient to establish
82
nexus in Miller Brothers.'
Regular professional travel to New Mexico in connection with the
contract in question might establish nexus with the services performed
outside the state, however. The threshold number of visits to be accorded
such constitutional significance would depend on the relative importance
of the New Mexico visits to the procurement of the contract and the
performance of R&D services thereunder.
Situation (5): The R&D firm's solicitation activities in New Mexico
that resulted in the procurement of the contract in question would probably
establish nexus with the services performed in California under that
contract. The Supreme Court has generally viewed in-state solicitation as

178. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70 and 78-82.
179. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
180. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250.
181. Under the standard enunciated in Besser Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 377, 382, 394
P.2d 141, 146 (1964) (see supra note 142), however, the small portion of the contract price allocable
to the New Mexico visits might not qualify for the occasional sale exemption under N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-28 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
182. Miller Brothers, 347 U.S. 340. Also, the delivery of the product of the services cannot alter
the place of performance of the services that are the subject of the sale. See supra text accompanying
note 174.
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establishing a taxing nexus with the resulting orders, albeit in the context
of interstate sales of tangible personal property." 3
However, in-state solicitation activities that were unrelated to the contract in question would probably not establish nexus under the holdings
8 5 Under those holdings, solicitation activities
in Norton'84 and Tyler Pipe."
would likely be considered "dissociated" from discrete R&D contracts
that did not result from such activities.
Situation (6): In this situation, the R&D firm's performance of a portion
of the contract in New Mexico constitutes "engaging in business in New
Mexico" and is subject to the GRT. But the remaining portion of the
contract raises the issue of whether the performance of services in California under the same contract can be "dissociated from the local
business" in New Mexico and therefore constitutionally protected from
the GRT. The answer to this question will depend on the nature, the
relationship between, and the relative importance of the New Mexico and
California components of the R&D firm's services.
In United States v. New Mexico,'8 the federal government challenged
the imposition of the GRT on reimbursements of general and administrative (G&A) expenses of contractors who performed R&D services at
White Sands Missile Range. The government reimbursed the G&A expenses
of its contractors and, in addition, the GRT imposed by New Mexico
on the G&A reimbursements. Although the GRT consequently increased
the cost of services to the government, the court of appeals concluded
as a general matter that the application of the GRT was constitutional
7
because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the contractors.'1
The court of appeals then had to determine whether the GRT could
be imposed on the G&A reimbursements. The trial court had excluded
these reimbursements from the tax on the ground that the G&A expenses
were incurred outside New Mexico. On this issue, the court first stated
a general rule barring New Mexico's taxation of services performed outside
the state: "Assuming that, when they received reimbursements for G&A
expenses, the contractors were being reimbursed for work (whether called
"services" or by any other name) performed outside New Mexico, it is
clear that New Mexico
taxing authorities would lack authority to tax
8
those transactions.'

8

9

The court qualified this rule, however, by stating: "Only where income
arising from a contract performed within the state accrues upon a separable
out-of-state transaction should it be excluded, as not being income arising

183. See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara. 486 U.S. 24 (1988); Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. 232;
Scripto, 362 U.S. 207; Norton, 340 U.S. 534.
184. Norton, 340 U.S. 534.

185. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. 232.
186. 581 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1978).
187. Id. at 806.
188. Id. at 810-11 (citing American Oil, 380 U.S. 457) (see supra text accompanying notes 78-

82).
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from contracting within the state."'8 9 Thus, the court found that services
performed outside New Mexico cannot be taxed if they are "separable"
or, as described in Norton and American Oil, "dissociated."
The court concluded that G&A expenses did not represent actual services
for which the government contracted separately, but were only incidental
to the operations of the contractors in New Mexico. The expenses were
a "cost accounting device" and "appear[ed] merely to be a component
of the price for services performed under the contracts in New Mexico."' 9
Since the G&A reimbursements "result[ed] solely from the contractor's
activities in New Mexico,"1 9' there were no "separable" services performed
outside the state, and the reimbursements were subject to the GRT.
Thus, United States v. New Mexico resolves one issue while raising
another: New Mexico cannot tax services performed outside the state,
but the out-of-state services must be "separable" from any in-state
activities to be so excluded. There is little guidance as to what constitutes
separability or inseparability. The example provided by United States v.
New Mexico is of limited usefulness, since it presents clearly inseparable
services. Although G&A expenses are theoretically based on the performance of support services, the expenses are calculated solely as a
function of the substantive effort under a contract, and specific G&A
services are never identified or viewed separately for any purpose.
The New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department has issued a
ruling' 92 that presents a somewhat more contentious fact situation and
conclusions. The ruling posits contracts for the sale and installation of
computers in a New Mexico facility and the development and installation
of software in the computers. The contractor will develop the softwarean R&D service-outside New Mexico. The ruling cites the initial use of
the software in New Mexico and concludes that the out-of-state service
is subject to the GRT under the 1989 amendment.
The sale of custom software developed outside New Mexico may present
a having-and-eating opportunity to taxing authorities, since the sale can
be regarded variously as a transfer of tangible or intangible property or
services. New Mexico generally treats custom software as a service, which
avoids the deduction for sales of tangible personal property to governmental and 501(c)(3) organizations.' 93 At the same time, however, the
property or product aspect of the software may also serve the purposes
of the taxing authorities. The R&D firm's installation of the software
and computers in New Mexico may defeat a claim that the software
development was a "separable" or "dissociated" service performed outside the state.

189. Id. at 811 (quoting Dravo Contracting Co. v. James, 114 F.2d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 1940).
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 678 (1941)).
190. Id. at 811.
191. Id.
192. Ruling 405-89-1 (June 14, 1989). Ruling 405-89-2 (also dated June 14, 1989) is virtually
identical. There have been no other administrative pronouncements on the 1989 amendment.
193. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54 (Supp. 1989) and § 7-9-60 (Repl. Pamp. 1988); N.M. Taxation
and Revenue Dept. G. R. Reg. 3(K):2, St. Tax Rep. (N.M.) (CCH)
65-427.
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These are slender reeds on which to build a general principle of
separability. However, we can identify two circumstances in which the
services might be considered inseparable: (1) the out-of-state services are
merely ancillary or incidental to services performed in New Mexico, and
(2) the out-of-state services will be incorporated in services or other
activities of the service provider in New Mexico. In both circumstances,
the service provider performs a portion of the contract in New Mexico,
and a transactional nexus with the out-of-state services is supplied by
the relationship with the provider's in-state activities.
If the out-of-state services are a "separable transaction," however, the
basic rule of United States v. New Mexico will apply, and the application
of the GRT to that portion of the contract will be constitutionally barred.
The outcome obviously will depend on the facts of the particular transaction. In Situation (6), then, we have presented insufficient details to
determine whether the out-of-state portion of the contract is subject to
the GRT. Clearly, however, the Tenth Circuit decision contemplates the
possibility of circumstances in which the out-of-state portion of the
contract is beyond the authority of New Mexico to tax.
VI.

A FAILED ATTEMPT: FLORIDA'S TAX ON OUT-OF-STATE
SERVICES

Two years before New Mexico amended the GRT to tax the sale of
services performed outside the state, Florida attempted to impose a more
elaborate tax on such services.1' Professor Walter Hellerstein, a leading
expert on state taxation, was enlisted to steer the Florida legislation
through the constitutional shoals. Even with Professor Hellerstein's assistance, however, the tax had to be amended a month after its adoption
to specifically exclude certain users without a Florida nexus. 95 And even
months
with its constitutional skirts in order, the tax was repealed six
97
later'96-the victim of a strong protest by affected industries.
The Florida tax survived too briefly for any court to consider its
validity under the United States Constitution.'9 The problems encountered
by the tax were largely political, however, and itstill serves as a theoretical
model for constitutionally permissible taxation of services performed in
another state. Professor Hellerstein described the Florida tax as follows:
The sale of the service is taxable if it is sold within the state; the
use of the service is taxable if it is sold outside the state but used
within the state and if the sale or use of the service has not been
subjected to taxation in another state.

194. 1987 Fla. Laws, Ch. 87-6.
195. 1987 Fla. Laws, Ch. 87-101.
196. 1987 Fla. Laws, Ch. 87-548.
197. See, e.g., letter from Thomas M. Nee, International President, Tax Executives Institute, to
Governor Bob Martinez (September 17, 1987), reprinted in 87 TAx NOTEs TODAY 187-11.
198. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the tax under the state constitution. See In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
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The sale of the service is in the state if (1) the service is performed
wholly in the state or if (2) the service is performed partly within
and partly outside the state, but the greater proportion of the service
is performed within the state based on costs of performance.
If the sale of the service is outside the state (because the greater
proportion of the service is performed outside the state based on
costs of performance) and the service is used in the state, a tax is
imposed on the use of the service in the state.'"
The Florida tax provided detailed rules for determining whether a
service was used in the state. For purposes of comparison with the New
Mexico GRT, however, the crucial element of the Florida tax is not how
the place of use was determined, but the fact that when the service was
performed outside the state, the tax was imposed on in-state use, if any,
not the out-of-state sale. Thus, the Florida tax avoided the need to
establish nexus with the seller of services performed outside the taxing
state, because the tax under such circumstances was imposed, if at all,
on the in-state use and user of the services.
In effect, Florida's tax on services performed outside the state was
similar to New Mexico's traditional compensating tax on the in-state use
of property acquired outside the state. 2°° New Mexico's compensating tax
does not apply to services rendered outside the state, however. 20 , And,
as we noted at the outset, amending the compensating tax to reach such
services would not affect the major New Mexico purchasers that are
immune from state taxation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

State taxes on interstate commerce are not absolutely barred by the
Constitution but must satisfy the four-part test enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Complete Auto Transit,202 requiring (1) nondiscrimination, (2)
fair apportionment, (3) fair relation to the benefits provided by the taxing
state, and (4) nexus. Under this constitutional test, the imposition of
New Mexico's gross receipts tax on sales of R&D services performed
outside the state will be barred for lack of adequate nexus, notwithstanding
the initial use of the product of the services in New Mexico, unless the
service provider engaged in business in New Mexico associated with the
out-of-state services.

199.
200.
201.
202.

Hellerstein, A Primer on Florida's Sales Tax on Services, 35 TAX NOTEs 1219 (1987).
See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
430 U.S. 274 (1977).

